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PREFACE
This article scrutinizes the latest recommendations pub-
lished by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment ("the OECD")' in its report "Harmful Tax
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue ("The Report").2 The
significance of these recommendations is profound. This article
seeks to expose the true meaning underlying this latest effort
by the OECD toward creating a "level playing field"3 in the in-
ternational taxation forum. Moreover, this article tries to: (1)
give meaning to terms that the OECD fails to define; (2) reveal
the means by which the OECD intends to encourage other na-
tions to adopt its utopian recommendations; and (3) bring to the
surface the significance of The Report's odious tenets.
Special attention is given to the ramifications of The Re-
port's recommendations upon sovereigns within the Caribbean
basin4, whose economic survival relies heavily on the offshore
financial investment industry. The article identifies those ar-
eas of The Report that appear overly ambiguous, subjective in
nature, and potentially in violation of public international law.
To clarify the basis of the critiques, the article traces who is
being harmed and who has the most to gain from this untenable
campaign against the economically inferior states.
Part I of this article provides a brief discussion of several
topics helpful for comprehending the juxtaposition of forces that
converge to create "frictions."5 The first subject discussed is
taxation and its nexus with the administration of an effective
government; the article familiarizes the reader with basic taxa-
tion concepts and boilerplate terms. Part I also provides a gen-
1 The OECD was born in 1961 from the need to restructure its predecessor,
the Organization for European Economic Co-operation. See infra Part I.B. See
also THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, HARM-
FUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 1 (1998) [hereinafter THE
REPORT].
2 Id.
3 Id. at 9.
4 For example the Cayman Islands, a British dependent territory. See The
Mounting Assault on Financial Privacy, OFFSHORE OUTLOOK, V.3 Issue 49 (1998).
5 Frictions arise between sovereigns when, in a global marketplace, countries
are forced to enter into administrative and political consultation to counter the
effects of living in an increasingly interdependent world. See R.F.M. Lubbers, The
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eral overview of the OECD's expanding role in the international
fiscal taxation arena. Additionally, it studies how the OECD is
continuously stymied by the economic and technological devel-
opments that drive globalization, 6 this century's greatest phe-
nomena. Lastly, Part I briefly summarizes the OECD's most
recent report.
Part II identifies the most odious portions of The Report,
those that receive the most criticism from experts in the field of
international taxation. It unmasks the true intent of The Re-
port's relevant sections. The final underlying meaning of The
Report and its utopian proposals is then ascertained through a
close examination of the language used. Part II also critiques
the recommended factors for determining whether a state is a
tax haven. 7 Lastly, this section explores the measures by which
the OECD intends to urge compliance.
Part III of this article, the conclusion, attempts to answer
the questions that the OECD's report has not addressed. Fur-
thermore, this section pinpoints the options and decisions which
offshore financial centers face in light of The Report's far reach-
ing recommendations. Lastly, the conclusion provides an exam-
ple of a situation involving a tax haven and a super-power state
who face just such dilemmas in light of The Report, and ob-
serves their reactions.
6 Globalization entails a migration of independent national economies to a
global marketplace; it is the becoming or making of 'worldwide.' See id. It is char-
acterized by a "continuously reinforced interaction between politics, technology,
and economies." Id.
7 See David E. Spencer, OECD Report Cracks Down on Harmful Tax Compe-
tition, 9 J. INT'L TAX'N 26, 31 (1998). A tax haven is a tax-sheltered place. It is a
tax paradise where a party is protected from taxation and allowed to reap the re-
ward of a tax-free environment. More precisely, a tax haven is " a country or terri-
tory that grants to individuals and corporations the opportunity to allow them to
escape from taxation in their country of origin, or to benefit from a tax system
which is more advantageous ...."; MICHEL W.E. GLAUTIER, FREDERICK W. BAS-
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I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. Taxation: The Sovereign Right
Taxation and the sovereign's absolute right to tax its sub-
jects have their origins "in antiquity."" The right to tax forms
one of the most intimate relationships between the sovereign
and its subjects. 9 Kings and dictators may have given way to
constitutional monarchs and democratic presidents, but taxa-
tion remains an essential part of government. 10 Governments
have thus been forced to develop and adjust their formal taxing
mechanisms to operate within the bounds of democratic
societies.'1
Taxation regimes, in their most primitive forms, evolved
from two competing notions that "every man payeth equally for
what he useth"'12 and that "the subjects of every state ought to
contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as
possible, in proportion to their respective abilities."'3 These two
divergent views have since become known, respectively, as the
benefit and the ability-to-pay theories. 14
8 THE GUIDE, supra note 7, at xi. The ability to raise revenue is directly
linked to the ability to rule. The ability to successfully raise revenue has always
been connected to and associated with the maintenance of a powerful and efficient
army. Armies were in turn used by the king to secure the loyalty of servants and
obtain the allegiance of other subjects. A weakened ruler would lose control over
his domain when the bank was empty, and thus render the state unable to buy the
allegiance of subjects. See id.
9 See id.
10 See id.
11 See id. The limits imposed in taxation under a democratic scheme are
grounded in the notion that the government's spending is under the watchfull eye
of the people, and that it is the people, not the king, who decide which taxes should
be imposed after the government's fiscal budget is determined. Under democracy,
governments are no longer free to arbitrarily impose taxes upon the people. See
THE GUIDE, supra note 7, at xi.
12 THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 239 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991) (1651).
13 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 310 (Edwin Cannan ed., Methuen & Co. 1925) (1776).
14 See James Buchanan, The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Sug-
gested Approach, in FISCAL THEORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY: SELECTED ESSAYS 12
& n.5 (University of North Carolina Press 1960) (1949). Under the benefit theory,
a just tax distributes the tax burden in accordance with the distribution of govern-
mental goods and services. See id. Meanwhile, under a pure ability-to-pay theory,
those with greater capacity pay more tax. See SMITH, supra note 13, at 310.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol12/iss1/7
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In modern society, taxation remains an essential ingredient
in the make-up of an effective government; because of this, na-
tions ardently guard their right to tax all entities within their
jurisdiction.' 5 While type and method can vary depending on
need, all independent states employ some formal system of tax-
ation. 16 Governments' ability to tax the subjects within their
national territory is based on one or all of the following ratio-
nales: (1) "citizenship"17 based taxation; (2) "residence"i8 based
taxation, and (3) "source"'19 based taxation. As a principle of cus-
tomary international law, a country has prescriptive jurisdic-
tion over its nationals, regardless of where they may be.20
15 See THE GUIDE, supra note 7, at xi. A nation's traditional jurisdiction ex-
tends to its physical boundaries, the boundary that under international law would
define or mark its domestic (national) territory. Lawyers often refer to this in a
legalistic sense as the point to where the "writ of sovereign law runs." Id. Practi-
cally, the state's right to tax is limited by its ability to exert its rights and author-
ity. See id.
16 See id.
17 See id. at 37. In a citizenship-based taxing jurisdiction, so long as the sub-
ject is a citizen of that state he incurs tax liability. Citizenship is determined
under the applicable laws of that state. An individual's citizenship is commonly
established by the place of birth. Corporations, much like individuals, are deemed
citizens of the jurisdiction in which they originate. For a corporation, their birth
place equivalent is the place in which they are incorporated. See THE GUIDE, supra
note 7, at 37-40.
18 See id. at 37. In a residence-based taxing jurisdiction, regardless of
whether the taxpayer is a citizen, simply being a resident of that jurisdiction is
alone reason enough to incur a tax. Residence is determined under that particular
jurisdiction's existing laws, a process that usually entails a determination of where
the subject normally resides and where he conducts a substantial amount of his
activities. In the case of an individual, residence is based on where he normally
lives. Most countries employ a number of days present in the jurisdiction test. See
id at 37, 41-43. For example, residency may attach to an individual after 183 days,
as is the case in the United States, or at a later time, such as 5 years, as is the case
in France. See id. at 43 tbl. 3-2. Generally, the residence of a corporation, much
like its citizenship, is presumed to be where the corporation was incorporated. See
id. at 44. However, this is not always the case. For example, under the law of the
United Kingdom [hereinafter the UK], even if a corporation is incorporated in
State B and merely holds its board meetings in the UK, it has nonetheless incurred
tax liability in the UK. See MILTON GRUNDY, THE WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL TAX
PLANNING 24 (1984).
19 See THE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 37. In a source-based taxing jurisdiction,
where neither citizenship nor residency is relevant, if a subject derives income
from a source within that jurisdiction he has incurred tax liability therein. Source,
as applied to both individuals and corporations, most commonly describes the geo-
graphic location from where income is derived. See id. at 38, 47-48.
20 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 411-415 (1986). Customary international law "results from a general
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These taxing mechanisms were substantially easier to im-
plement in times when people and resources were highly immo-
bile, as lack of movement made it easy to determine which
taxing jurisdiction an entity was and should be subject to. How-
ever, as entities expanded their activities across national bor-
ders, they exposed themselves to the potential of taxation in an
increasingly, even in a theoretically infinite, number of jurisdic-
tions. 21 When the activity and/or the location of the entity
crosses national borders, the entity becomes subject to "double
taxation."22 Double taxation surfaces because each jurisdiction,
as it is rightfully empowered to do, taxes activities and entities
within its borders as it deems fit; this creates conflicts of law as
multiple nations' taxing authorities attempt to claim jurisdic-
tion over the same activity or entity.23 Ideally, an entity in such
an undesirable position could turn to some other supreme body
of law, perhaps international tax law, to resolve these conflicts;
however, no such universal body of law exists. 24
As capital resources become more mobile, entities seek to
move their resources into low or "zero-tax"25 jurisdictions, oth-
erwise categorized as tax havens, in an attempt to maximize
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of obligation." Id.
at § 102(2).
21 See THE GUIDE, supra note 7, at xii.
22 See id. at 10. In its simplest form, double taxation occurs whenever an en-
tity is taxed more than once on the same activity. Double taxation can occur inter-
nally within one sovereign's national borders. For example, in the United States,
Canada, Australia, Switzerland, and South Africa, taxes on corporations and indi-
viduals may be levied by both the local provincial government and the federal gov-
ernment. See id. at 38. The bigger problem lies in international double taxation,
which results from conflicts between the autonomous taxing authorities of differ-
ent countries. For example, company XYZ has its head office in country G and
branches in countries I, R, and S. Assuming each branch is a resident under that
country's residency requirements, then company XYZ must pay tax to G, I, R, and
S. Double taxation on an individual level often occurs when a taxpayer, resident in
one country, receives some income from another country. Illustrative of this would
be when a citizen of country Z is lawfully residing in country D and receives stock
dividends from a company in country H. The income received could be subject to
tax in country Z based on citizenship, country D based on residence, and country H
based on source. See id. at 155-7, 165.
23 See id. at 165.
24 See THE GUIDE, supra note 7, at xiii ("[tihe concept of a body of interna-
tional tax law agreed to in terms of an international charter does not exist.").
25 GRUNDY, supra note 18, at 57. Although a few zero-tax jurisdictions exist in
the Pacific and the Persian Gulf, the majority of them are located within the Carib-
bean. For the most part, each are capable of offering the same services; however, a
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol12/iss1/7
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their return by reducing costs. Along with the growing popular-
ity of tax havens,26 "high tax countries,"27 realizing that their
own unilateral actions will not suffice, have sought the assis-
tance of international organizations and encouraged a coordi-
nated approach to counter the resulting vacuum effect that tax
havens are having on their respective national tax bases. 28
Nations can no longer worry solely about the national ef-
fects of a chosen taxing scheme. 29 Because of the increased inte-
gration of national economies, nations must now also factor into
their tax system design the potential interactions their system
may have with the systems of their sovereign global neighbors,
and take on the often-impracticable task of designing tax sys-
tems that interact well with those systems.30 Each sovereign is
thus faced with two competing policy determinations: (1) to try
and protect the revenue yielded from its tax base, and (2) to
maintain a tax climate that favors the inflow of investment and
discourages the outflow of domestic capital resources. 31 A sure
method of accomplishing this while remaining competitive in
the global market place is yet to be found, however, various ap-
proaches and recommendations have been proffered.
few of these jurisdictions have developed a niche. For example, the Cayman Is-
lands feature flexible company laws and attractive trusts laws. See id. at 66.
26 It is estimated that the Cayman Islands, the world's eighth largest finan-
cial center, has attracted nearly $500 billion in deposits. See Michael Allen, A
Gathering Storm Threatens to Swamp Offshore Banking, 98 WALL ST. J. EUR. 13
(1998); see also THE REPORT, supra note 1, at para. 35 ("the available data do sug-
gest that the current use of tax havens is large, and that participation in such
schemes is expanding at an exponential rate.") (emphasis added).
27 See THE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 53. High tax countries consist, for the most
part, of industrialized nations. These nations face very high levels of government
spending, diminishing rates of productivity from the work force, onerous budget
deficits and increased burdens of debt, which force them to continue at taxing at
intolerable rates. See id. at 265. Corporate tax rates among these high tax coun-
tries range from 34% in the United Kingdom to 56.5% in Germany. The United
States' overall corporate tax rate is not much better at 38.3%. See OECD, TAXING
PROFITS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL IssuEs 71 tbl. 3.14
(1991) [hereinafter TAXING PROFITS]. In regard to personal taxation on interest
income, the above countries' tax rate average is 20%, 39.1% and 28%, with the
distinction of the highest average tax rate going to Austria at 39.7%. See id. at 78
tbl. 3.19.
28 See THE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 266; see also TAXING PROFITS, supra note
27, at 13.
29 See TAXING PROFITS, supra note 27, at 13.
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B. The Inception of the OECD
The OECD was established in 1961 to continue the work of
its predecessor, the Organisation for European Economic Co-op-
eration ("OEEC").3 2 The OEEC was instituted shortly after the
Second World War to assist in rebuilding Europe, but it was
unable to keep pace with the ever-changing global market
place. Trade barriers within Europe were crumbling, the once
immeasurable distance between industrialized nations sepa-
rated by oceans was shrinking, and spill over effects from one
nation's economic policies into neighboring countries were be-
ginning to surface. 33 This increasing interdependence amongst
industrialized nations caused the notion of international eco-
nomic cooperation to become much more attractive for both Eu-
ropean and North American countries. 34  The OEEC,
recognizing that time to cooperate on a worldwide basis was
ripe, prepared for a major organizational restructuring.
In December of 1959, the Presidents of the United States
and France, along with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic
of Germany and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
met in Paris 35 to take the first steps in establishing the OECD,
and to announce their intentions to implement a plan for eco-
nomic cooperation. 36 On the 12th and 13th of January 1960,3 7
32 See generally THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVEL-
OPMENT, THE OECD 9 (16th ed.) [hereinafter The Book]. The OEEC was estab-
lished under the auspices of the Marshall Plan to administer aid and assist the
European continent in recovering from the economic disaster of World War I1.
Those two tasks had all but been completed in 1961. Even before 1961, the OEEC
had started to recognize its inability to better address the needs of a rapidly ex-
panding Europe. See id.
33 See id.
34 The United States and Canada formed the North American contingency.
See id. at 10.
35 See id.
36 The intentions were incorporated into the communiqu6, issued at the close
of the December 21st meeting, which read as follows:
[r]ecognising the great economic progress of Western Europe . . . [and]
that virtually all of the industrialized part of the free world is now in a
position to devote its energies in increased measure to new and important
tasks of co-operative endeavor with object of: (a) furthering the develop-
ment of less developed countries, and (b) pursuing trade policies directed
to the sound use of economic resources and the maintenance of harmoni-
ous international relations, thus contributing to growth and stability in
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representatives from thirteen countries 38 and the European Ec-
onomic Commission met and adopted resolutions, which were
unanimously approved, enumerating certain preliminary ac-
tions that needed to be taken.3 9 As a result of this meeting, a
group of four persons, later known as the "Four Wise Men,"40
were selected and began holding meetings in Paris to work to-
ward setting up this new and improved organization.
On April 7, 1960 the long anticipated report of the Four
Wise Men, entitled "A Remodeled Economic Organisation,"
4 1
was released. The preamble of the report stressed the great eco-
nomic strides of Western Europe and its two new associates, the
United States and Canada; it noted new types of problems that
demanded a unified front, and it described the spill over effect
of economic policies into neighboring countries. 42 The report
proposed that the remodeled OEEC should be called the OECD,
a name that would not only emphasize the organization's con-
cern for the growth of its own members, but also fortify the or-
ganization's interest in the economic health of lesser-developed
countries. 43 The report defined the aims of the organization,
44
See The Book, supra note 32, at 10-11.
37 See id. at 11.
38 Belgium, Canada, France, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom and the United States. See id. n.1.
39 The representatives from the thirteen governments and the European Eco-
nomic Commission proposed that: (1) A meeting of senior officials from the twenty
governments be held in Paris on April 19, 1960 to consider the best means to at-
tain its objectives; (2) a group of four persons be appointed to prepare a report
examining the most effective methods for attaining their objectives and that appro-
priate recommendations also be made; (3) prepare and submit for approval the
necessary articles of the agreement, and (4) identify any current functions of the
OEEC which would continue to be governed under the proposed improved organi-
zation; and (3) the above appointed group consult with all twenty governments and
any relevant international organizations in preparing their report. See id. at 11-
12.
40 The group was composed of Ambassador W. Randolph Burgess, M. Bernard
Clappier of France, Sir Paul Gore-Booth of the United Kingdom, and Mr. Xeno-
phon Zolotas of Greece. See id. at 13 & n.2.
41 See The Book, supra note 32, at 11.
42 See id. at 14.
43 See id.
44 The aims, as finally agreed to under Article 1, were to:
(a) achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and the employment
and rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining fi-
nancial stability, and thus contribute to the development of the world
9
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suggested that the founding membership initially be limited to
members and associates of the OEEC, including the United
States and Canada, 45 provided provisions for accepting new
members, 46 enumerated the obligations of its members, 47 and
made recommended a smooth transitional period.
48
In order to assure a "smooth transitional period," the report
called for the establishment of a Preparatory Committee ("Com-
mittee") whose composition included representatives from the
twenty governments and which was chaired by the Secretary
General Designate. 49 The Committee began working on the
14th of September and continued without interruption until No-
vember 23rd, 1960.50 On December 13th, in a meeting held in
Paris, the Ministers of each member country approved the Com-
mittee's report and on the next day the Convention establishing
the OECD was signed. 51 During the first nine months of 1961,
the primary focus was on the continued restructuring of the
nascent organization into what is now the OECD.52 By Septem-
ber 30th the OECD was in full operation and had passed the
transitional phase with extraordinary smoothness.
53
The OECD has continued to meet and address the problems
that confront its members in the ever-changing, fast-paced
global environment. The OECD has thus far withstood the test
of time and remained true to its philosophy of a unified multi-
lateral approach to seeking solutions for matters that pose a
danger to its members. With the globalization of economies, the
emergence of third world countries in the international market
place, and the increasing free flow of investments, the OECD is
economy; (b) to contribute to sound economic expansion of Member as well
as non-member countries in the process of economic development; and (c)
to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-dis-
criminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.
Id. at 19.
45 See id. at 14.
46 See The Book, supra note 32, at 14.
47 See id.
48 See id. at 14-15.
49 See id. at 14.
50 See id. at 15.
51 See The Book, supra note 32, at 15-16.
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now faced with a new breed of problems that it may well be ill
equipped to handle.54
C. The Interim: Globalization-The Economic Phenomena of
the 20th Century
Globalization, 55 arguably the Twentieth Century's greatest
economic event, is believed to be a direct by-product of liberaliz-
ing national economies.56 The crumbling of international trade
and investment barriers, when considered in conjunction with
the recent technological boom, has forced both governments and
multinational enterprises ("MNEs") 57 to implement global
strategies if they desire to remain competitive. Along with the
advent of technology and a globalized market place has come
the ease with which entities may move capital across borders
and the expansion of international financial markets.58 Gov-
ernments, MNEs and individuals have all felt globalization's
positive effects in some form or other.59
Advancements in technology, together with the increased
mobility of capital and the highly competitive financial environ-
ment, have posed new challenges for governments. Govern-
ments are under fire to: (1) determine which revenue and
expenditure structures are best suited to their political and so-
54 For example, some of the new problems with which the OECD is faced are
dealing with limited capacity of local taxing authorities to control the outflow of
capital resources as these resources become highly mobile. See THE REPORT, supra
note 1, at para. 4, 11, 13.
55 See Lubbers, supra note 5.
56 See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
57 MNE's are entities that conduct their affairs in numerous countries. In es-
sence, an MNE is considered completely operational in each country that it is in.
In comparison, an international enterprise extends its net of activities across na-
tional borders. An example of such activities would be import and export opera-
tions. Also in existence are global enterprises that look at the world economy as
one market. See generally Lubbers, supra note 5.
58 See The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Harm-
ful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (visited Sep. 11, 1998) <http://
www.oecd.org//daf/fa/TAXCOMP/taxcomp.htm> [hereinafter The Site].
59 Some of the more positive affects according to the OECD have been: (1)
modernization of taxing systems via tax reforms; (2) erosion of the links between a
MNE and any one nation; (3) reduced costs of capital to MNEs; (4) encouraged
governments to fine tune their taxing and spending systems to make their invest-
ment markets more attractive, and (5) enhanced prosperity for the individual in-
vestor. See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-14.
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cial conditions (based primarily on their ideological beliefs);60
(2) develop policies to continue taxing activities that are in-
creasingly more mobile in nature, while not having those same
policy determinations spill over into neighboring states; and (3)
close the gaping holes which corporations and individuals may
use to "escape" taxation. 61
Countries whose borders have been blurred because of the
globalizing phenomena have been forced to sacrifice too much of
their sovereignty in order to reap the benefits of partaking in
the global marketplace. 62 Globalization has also resulted in the
odious tenet, embraced by a few industrialized nations63 and
other non-governmental world organizations, 64 that hold that
because an entity is a world leader it may impose its own laws
and value systems extraterritorially. Professor Lubbers, a lead-
ing scholar of the globalization process, who stated "we may
have one world, but we will have to make due with states,"
65
has summarily critiqued this tenet. Clearly, the inference to be
drawn from this statement is that, although the world may be
shrinking, governments nonetheless continue to do their work
on the basis of territoriality within the borders of their own
state. 66 This places great emphasis on the preservation of a
state's territorial sovereignty as mandated under the Charter of
60 See MASON GAFFNEY, INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION: HARMFUL OR BENE-
FICIAL? 6-7 (August 1998); THE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 155-156.
61 See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at para. 42. It should be noted that, in past
reports, the OECD has attempted to distinguish between "tax avoidance" and "tax
evasion," the former being lawful while the latter is unlawful. See OECD, INTERNA-
TIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 10-11 (1987). However, it seems that the
OECD no longer wishes to make this distinction and thus has created a new term
in the field of tax mitigation-to "escape" taxes. See GAFFNEY, supra note 60, at 15.
62 See generally Lubbers, supra note 5. Sovereign administrative powers of
states have been weakened by: (1) erosion of borders making it easier for cross-
border flows of capital; (2) need for international collaboration to tackle problems,
and (3) short-term thinking syndrome within governmental organs and electoral
cycle. See id.
63 Such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany. See THE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 54.
64 For example, the OECD and the World Trade Organization. See generally
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the United Nations 67 and as recognized under public interna-
tional law. 68
The OECD recognized the dangers presented by a global
marketplace competing for highly mobile activities, and
through various instruments 69 sought out the support of both
its members and non-members to aid it in resolving the difficul-
ties it could not cure on its own. 70 In its latest efforts against
the incongruity of national taxation systems, the OECD has
once again called upon this coordinated global approach.
D. Advent of The Report: "Harmful Tax Competition: An
Emerging Global Issue"71
In May 1996, the expanded OECD72 was summoned to "de-
velop measures to counter the distorting effects of harmful tax
competition on investment and financing decisions and the con-
sequences for national tax bases, and report back in 1998."73
The mandate received vast support from the world's seven larg-
est players, the "G7," 74 who stood to suffer the most if the man-
67 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 & 8. Article 2 of the United Nations Char-
ter maintains that "[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state . . ." and further provides that "[n]othing contained in the pre-
sent charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . ." Id.
68 See supra, Part I.A.
69 Some of the OECD's earlier reports are: ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXA-
TION: INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION (1987), TAXING PROFITS IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES (1991) and TAX INFORMA-
TION EXCHANGE BETWEEN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES: A SURVEY OF CURRENT PRAC-
TICES (1994).
70 See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at para. 4-14.
71 Id. at 1.
72 The OECD now consists of 29 members. The original members, namely
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, were joined by nine ac-
cessionists: Japan (April 28th, 1964), Finland (January 28th, 1969), Australia
(June 7th, 1971), New Zealand (May 29th, 1973), Mexico (May 18th, 1994), the
Czech Republic (December 21st, 1995), Hungary (May 7th, 1996), Poland (Novem-
ber 26th, 1996) and Korea (December 12th, 1996). See id. at 2.
73 Id. at 3.
74 See Les Sommest des Sept Pays Industriales, Lyon - Sommet du G7 (visited
Oct. 28, 1998) <http://www.ccn.cs.dal.ca/Current/HalifaxSummitG7/g7-glos.html
#g7>. The G7 or "Group of Seven," is composed of the world's seven largest econo-
mies: the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan,
13
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date failed and the status quo continued. The OECD reacted by
assigning its Committee on Fiscal Affairs to begin working on
this issue.7 5
After two years of work, the Special Sessions on Tax Com-
petition, the self-created arm of the OECD's Committee on Fis-
cal Affairs that was jointly chaired by France and Japan,
presented the results and formally issued The Report.76 The
Report summarizes itself as follows:
Globalisation has had positive effects on the development of tax
systems and has encouraged countries to engage in base broaden-
ing and rate reducing tax reforms. However, it has also created
an environment in which tax havens thrive and in which govern-
ments may be induced to adopt harmful preferential tax regimes
to attract mobile activities. Tax competition in the form of harm-
ful tax practices can distort trade and investment patterns, erode
national tax bases and shift part of the tax burden onto less mo-
bile tax bases, such as labor and consumption, thus adversely af-
fecting employment and undermining the fairness of tax
structures.
The Report emphasizes that governments must intensify
their cooperative actions to curb harmful tax practices. To achieve
this, OECD Member governments have developed 'Guidelines on
Harmful Preferential Tax Regimes.' These Guidelines will dis-
courage the spread of harmful preferential tax regimes and en-
courage countries with such regimes to eliminate them. To
counteract both tax havens and harmful preferential regimes,
Member governments have also agreed to pursue vigorously the
France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada. See id. The G7's endorsement
was noted in their communiqu6 from their summit meeting in Lyon, France which
read as follows:
Finally, globalisation is creating new challenges in the field of tax policy.
Tax schemes aimed at attracting financial and other geographically mo-
bile activities can create harmful tax competition between States, carry-
ing risks of distorting trade and investment and could lead to the erosion
of national tax bases. WE STRONGLY URGE THE OECD TO VIGOROUSLY PUR-
SUE ITS WORK IN THE FIELD, AIMED AT ESTABLISHING A MULTILATERAL AP-
PROACH UNDER WHICH COUNTRIES COULD OPERATE INDIVIDUALLY AND
COLLECTIVELY TO LIMIT THE EXTENT OF THESE PRACTICES. We will follow
closely the progress on the work by the OECD ....
See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. (emphasis added).
75 See id. at 3 (emphasis added).
76 See id. at para. 3; see generally The Site, supra note 58.
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implementation of other Recommendations in The Report, includ-
ing entering into a dialogue with non-member countries. 77
The analysis and proposals of The Report are rooted in the pro-
position that as we move toward a global free market, key re-
sources such as labor and capital become more mobile and are
drawn into more attractive low tax states,78 thus eroding the
national tax bases of high tax states.
II. THE REPORT: FULLY EXPOSED
A. Defining Harmful79
At the outset, The Report makes its intent to focus on
counteracting "harmful tax practices" 80 readily apparent. How-
ever, The Report never clearly states what the OECD considers
harmful. For instance, paragraph 30 of The Report states that
jurisdictions "that drive the effective rate tax rate levied on in-
come [generated] from the mobile activities significantly below
rates in other countries have the potential to cause harm. .. ."
(emphasis added).8 1 At no time does The Report propose or
even suggest a minimum effective tax rate that could be used as
a type of demarcation point to determine when a jurisdiction
should be considered to have engaged in this harmful act.8 2
Moreover, the Report, in its see-sawing format, concedes that
some effects of tax competition are acceptable and actually sub-
stantially beneficial.8 3
The Report's concession is most obvious when it states that
"intensified competition ... in the global market place has had
77 See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at back cover.
78 See GAFFNEY, supra note 60, at 2.
79 Black's Law Dictionary defines harm as "[tihe existence of loss or detriment
in fact of any kind... resulting from any cause." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY (6th ed.
1990).
80 See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at para. 4. Paragraph 4 explicitly reads:
"[tihe Report is intended to develop a better understanding of how tax havens and
preferential tax regimes, collectively referred to as harmful tax practices affect the
location of financial ... activities, erode [national] tax bases ... , distort trade and
investment patterns . See id. (emphasis added).
81 Id. at para. 30.
82 See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 7, at 32.
83 Beneficial effects include simplification of tax systems, improving the in-
vestment and financial markets, expansion of international financial markets and
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and continues to have many positive effects."8 4 What The Re-
port does object to are the effects that result from what it labels
harmful tax competition. Similar to the flaw discussed above,
here too The Report also fails to delimit the point at which ac-
ceptable tax competition ceases and harmful tax competition
begins.8 5
The Report does not (nor could it ever) admit to being sub-
jective but it comes dangerously close at various points. Not
only is the substantially lowered effective tax rate test subjec-
tive to the individual country,8 6 but The Report itself says that
"lt]ax competition and the interaction of tax systems can have
effects that some countries may view as negative or harmful but
others may not."87 Thus, countries have no choice but to remain
cautious because no clear guiding standard is formulated. Es-
sentially, by not espousing any standard, The Report seems to
allow for any country that deems itself as being harmed to make
a claim. 8
Although any country may theoretically bring a claim on
the grounds that it is being harmed by another's practices, after
considering the make-up of the OECD and the history of the
campaign against tax havens, it becomes evident that The Re-
port's harmful test is relative to those countries with the most
to lose.8 9 Surely, The Report would not allow for two jurisdic-
tions that meet the criterion 90 of a tax haven to claim they are
being harmed by another low tax state. Thus, The Report, al-
beit implicitly, seeks to shelter high tax states exclusively.
84 Id. at para. 37.
85 See, e.g., GAFFNEY, supra note 60, at 2.
86 For instance if country X's corporate tax rate is 55% and its neighbor, coun-
try B enacts a corporate tax of 40%, which is still relatively high, country X can
claim that by doing so country B is harming it because no minimum effective tax
rate below which a country can not go is ever mentioned in the Report. See gener-
ally Spencer, supra note 7, at 32.
87 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at para. 27.
88 See generally GAFFNEY, supra note 60, at 2.
89 The U.S. has traditionally spearheaded the campaign against tax havens.
As tax havens have lured in more and more business, tax administrations of devel-
oped countries have become more and more concerned. These developed countries
face increased spending requirements and have seen their deficits grow, thus for
them more is at stake. See THE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 265-266. High tax coun-
tries, led by the U.S., have decided that "the real culprits in the flight of invest-
ment capital [are] tax havens and their users." Id. at 55.
90 See infra Part II.B.
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B. Identifying a Tax Haven
Prior to considering the OECD's identifying factors, it
should first be noted that even those nations who have the most
to lose, the high tax states who have taken it upon themselves
to develop a list of tax havens, have never been able to agree on
an identical list of tax havens.9 1 Essentially, this is because the
area of international taxation is one where no consensus has
ever existed. Which states are considered tax havens and which
are not has always depended upon who you asked, a determina-
tion that the OECD now seeks to harmonize in its report.92
The Report's starting point for identifying a tax haven re-
quires asking "whether a jurisdiction imposes no or only nomi-
nal taxes" 93 and whether it "offers itself, or is perceived to offer
itself, as a place to be used by non-residents to escape tax in
their country of residence." 94 The Report's other "key factors"95
include "lack of effective exchange of information,"96 "lack of
transparency,"97 and "no substantial activities. "98 These fac-
91 See THE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 231. The U.S. Internal Revenue Service
[hereinafter IRS] considers some 30 jurisdictions as tax havens; Milton Grundy, an
English tax expert, lists 13 to 19, and Andre Beauchamp, an expert from France,
compiled a list of 47. Although all three agree on a few jurisdictions, such as the
Bahamas, Luxembourg, and the Cayman Islands, they are in dispute regarding
others, such as Singapore, Switzerland, Barbados and Panama. See id. at 232 &
tbl. 15.1 at 233. Beauchamp's list is the only one of the three to consider the UK a
tax haven. Beauchamp's definition of a tax haven, the most helpful of the three,
may be summarized as follows: "[a] Tax Haven is country or territory that grants
to individuals and corporations the opportunity to allow them to escape from taxa-
tion in their country of origin, or to benefit from a tax system which is more advan-
tageous to them ... ," Id. at 232. Partly because of the leadership role of the U.S.,
most nations use the IRS' list as a guideline. See id. at 232.
92 See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
93 Id. at 22. Even if a jurisdiction has a taxing system in place, it may, none-
theless, be included as a tax haven. For example, although a jurisdiction may im-
pose some tax, and thus fail the first requirement, that jurisdiction may still be
considered as not having any taxes in place if its domestic source income tax is
narrowly applied. See id. at para. 52.
94 Id. at para. 52 (emphasis added).
95 Id. at 23. The Report stresses the importance of each of these factors
within a particular context. See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at para. 52.
96 Id. at 23. Determination of lack of effective exchange of information is
based on the existence of secrecy laws and other nondisclosure rules from which
entities may benefit because it protects them against scrutiny from tax authorities.
See id.; see generally, SPENCER, supra note 7, at 31.
97 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 23. Lack of transparency refers specifically to
a jurisdiction's administrative practices, be they legal, legislative, or simply ad-
ministrative. An example would be a law that bars bank officials, at the risk of
20001
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tors, not surprisingly, resemble those traditional indicia of a tax
haven 99 as composed by the United State's Internal Revenue
Service.
1. No or Nominal Taxes and Perception
The decision to tax or not to tax and the manner in which to
tax within domestic borders is one that has always been within
the absolute discretion of each sovereign. 100 International law
proscribes that the "enforcement jurisdiction of a country is lim-
ited to its own borders .... ,,101 Implicit in the principle of sover-
eignty is the fundamental belief that no sovereign is
subordinate to another; all sovereigns are seen as equal in the
eye of international law. 10 2 By using a state's method of taxa-
tion as a determinative factor, The Report impinges upon terri-
criminal punishment, from divulging information about a depositor. This, the Re-
port says, facilitates tax evasion and avoidance. See id. at para. 53.
98 Id. at 23. No substantial activities, according to the Report, provides an
inference that these jurisdictions are not attempting in good faith to attract busi-
nesses, but rather are solely focused on attracting investments for tax evading pur-
poses because they are not requiring substantial business to occur within their
own territory. See id. at para. 55.
99 The IRS which states that there is no definition of a tax haven, developed
the following criteria in identifying a tax haven: (1) imposition of no or low tax (as
compared with the US); (2) high levels of bank secrecy; (3) importance of banking
and financial sectors to the jurisdiction; (4) availability of modern communications;
(5) lack of foreign currency controls, and (6) self promotion as a tax haven. See THE
GUIDE, supra note 7, at 232-234.
100 See supra Part I.A. See also GAFFNEY, supra note 60, at 4-5 (The authority
to tax is "[plurely sovereign power. Under public international law, the sover-
eignty of a state is recognised as territorial in scope."); Arthur J. Cockfield, Tax
Integration Under NAFTA: The Conflict Between Economic and Sovereignty Issues
34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39 ("[n] ation-states ... find the prospect of ceding the power to
shape tax policies - policies traditionally used to pursue domestic political, social,
and economic goals-unnerving.") (emphasis added); Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness
and The Taxation of International Income 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 145, 166
("[u]nder the principal of territoriality, in customary international law, a sovereign
has prescriptive competence with respect to the activities occurring and the wealth
existing within its territorial borders.") quoting from RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 411-415 (1986); THE GUIDE,
supra note 7, at 157 (there are "no restrictions that limit the sovereignty of coun-
tries with regard to taxation.")
101 THE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 157 quoting from F.A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 95 (1973).
102 See ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RE-
LATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD 32 (1990).
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torial sovereignty, 0 3 an act otherwise violative of international
law and long-standing international doctrines.104
The Report concludes that no two taxing systems will ever
be identical, because of each country's differing budgetary
needs, varying levels of natural resource wealth, and deeply
rooted and often contradicting ideological views.10 5 Nonethe-
less, The Report insists on seeking a universal "level playing
field." 10 6 It calls for a uniform tax across the globe, a goal to be
achieved by imposing the standards of its most powerful mem-
bers, The Report's "internationally accepted standards."10 7
Paragraph fifty-two explicitly states that when a jurisdic-
tion "offers itself, or is perceived to offer itself, as a place to be
used by non-residents to escape taxes. . ."108 it may, when com-
bined with the fact that it levies no or nominal taxes, be consid-
103 Sovereignty in the internal arena denotes the "constitutional independence
of other states." See id. at 32. Sovereignty "is a legal, absolute, and unitary condi-
tion." Id. at 32 quoting from ALAN JAmEs, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD 25 (1986). Sover-
eignty as between states connotes independence and is essentially the right to
exercise within its borders, to the exclusion of all others, the traditional functions
of a state. See INGRID DETTER DELuPIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SOVEREIGN
STATE 3-4 (1987). Sovereignty refers to "the totality of powers which States may,
under international law, have." JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 27 (1979).
104 Not only is it a violation of territorial sovereignty, but also a manner by
which governments may circumvent the Act of State Doctrine. Essentially, the Act
of State Doctrine binds every sovereign to respect the independence of every other
sovereign, and it mandates that the judiciary of one country may not sit in judg-
ment on the acts of another nation when those acts occur within that state's terri-
torial boundaries. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). Thus, the
Report is sanctioning other branches of government-the executive or legislative-to
do what the judiciary was barred from doing because of the sanctity of a state's
sovereignty. It is punishing states for acts, namely deciding how to tax within its
borders, that are deemed unfavorable from the viewpoint of high tax states.
105 Paragraph 26 of the Report reads: "[tihe Committee recognises that there is
no particular reasons why any two countries should have the same level and struc-
ture of taxation. Although differences in tax levels and structures may have [nega-
tive effects] for other countries, these are essentially political decisions for national
governments. THE REPORT, supra note 1, at para. 26 (emphasis added).
106 Id. at para. 8. The Report considers a "level playing field" a necessity for
the continued global economic growth. See id. But if tax competition was in part
responsible for globalization, as the Report concedes, and the Report is now urging
for identical tax systems with identical rates, no room for competition would exist.
See generally GAFFNEY, supra note 60, at 6.
107 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at para. 26. The report once again fails to define
what the internationally accepted standard is. See generally GAFFNEY, supra note
60, at 6.
108 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at para. 52.
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ered a tax haven.10 9 The word perception implies subjectivity,
as it leaves the determination of which jurisdiction is a tax ha-
ven to the eye of the beholder. 110 The inadequacy of using per-
ception as a consideration is demonstrated by the fact that no
two experts have been able to agree upon a single list of tax
havens."' Under a perception standard even high tax states
may in theory be considered tax havens for some limited pur-
poses.' 12 Thus, by using perception as a criterion, the question
inevitably becomes: a tax haven according to whom?
2. Lack of Effective Exchange of Information and Lack of
Transparency
The Report is once again keying in on a decision that is ulti-
mately one of the national government. Lack of effective ex-
change of information and lack of transparency are so
interwoven that it might be helpful to consider them together.
Both factors stem from the decision of a government to enact
legislation within its borders to bar officials from divulging in-
formation to foreign tax authorities. 113 Whether a government
permits its industries to divulge client information is a decision,
as The Report recognizes, traditionally reserved to the
sovereign. "14
Although the high degree of privacy afforded by tax haven
states is common thread, this is not to say that tax havens have
been fully uncooperative in exchanging information with for-
eign authorities. 1 5 In areas where a consensus exists, such as
in drug trafficking and money laundering, virtually all tax ha-
ven states have recognized the need to cooperate. 116 In the area
109 See id. at para. 46.
110 See THE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 232.
111 See supra Part I.A.
112 For instance, in the UK non-residents are generally not subject to capital
gains tax on interest income paid by UK banks, thus making it attractive for for-
eigners. See GRUNDY, supra note 18, at 23.
113 For example, the Cayman Islands law subjects a banker to fines and im-
prisonment if he divulges information of a client to foreign authorities. See Allen,
supra note 26, at 13.
114 See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at para. 53-54.
115 The Report acknowledges that "[slome progress has been made in the area
of access to information ... that permit[s] exchange of information on criminal tax
matters related to certain other crimes . . . ." Id. at para. 54.
116 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties in Criminal Matters Treaties [hereinaf-
ter MLATS] between the US and 19 other countries (for example: Switzerland in
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of fiscal taxation, no such consensus exists. Nevertheless, a
state's failure to enter into a treaty that may be of no benefit to
them1 17 is factored into the formula of identifying a tax haven.
The Report seeks to criminalize an area where no international
body of law exists by punishing those states who do not follow
the new so called internationally accepted standards because
they do not regard fiscal crimes as seriously. 118
3. No Substantial Activities
The Report states that "the absence of a requirement that
the activity be substantial is important since it would suggest
that a jurisdiction may be attempting to attract investment or
transactions that are purely tax driven."119 The "no substantial
activities" requirement calls for individual governments to
make an assessment of what they consider substantial, and
thus an entity's economic activity must conform to what the rel-
evant government unilaterally deems appropriate.1 20 The word
substantial is often referred to as a "term of art" within Ameri-
can jurisprudence because it connotes a government's ability to
impose its own views on its citizens.
C. OECD Recommendations: The Call for Compliance via
International Coercion
The Report's third chapter, "Counteracting Harmful Tax
Competition," enumerates nineteen total recommendations that
may be adopted to curb harmful tax practices.12' The recom-
mendations are proposed under the belief that "[giovernments
cannot stand back while their tax bases are eroded through the
1977, the UK concerning the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Anguilla,
Monsterrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands in 1990, and the Bahamas in 1989)
have been entered into force and 15 more MLATS have already been signed. See
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaties and Other Agreements (vis-
ited Oct. 30, 1998) <http://travel.state.gov/mlat.html>.
117 For example, the Cayman Islands, because they don't impose any taxes and
don't need to be concerned with tax evaders, have no incentive to expend its valua-
ble resources to assist other nations locate tax evaders. See, e.g., Allen, supra note
26.
118 See generally THE GUIDE, supra note 7, at xiii; Allen, supra note 26, at 13;
GAFFNEY, supra note 60, at 15-16.
119 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
120 See generally GAFFNEY, supra note 60, at 15-16.
121 See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 37.
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actions of countries that offer tax payers ways to exploit tax
havens .... ,,122 In sum, The Report attempts to prevent a "race
to the bottom" 123 effect. Implementation of these recommenda-
tions requires "co-ordinated action at the international level
.. 124 because the suggested measures would be more effective
if they "conform to practices adopted at the international
level."125
The Report, in order to maintain its integrity, has resorted
to adopting the politically correct language of the times. 126 The
greatest evidence of this is paragraph 29, which acknowledges
that it is acceptable for a nation to devise its own tax system, so
long as they do not
redirect capital and financial flows and the corresponding reve-
nue from the other jurisdictions by bidding aggressively for the
tax base of other countries. Some have described this effect as
'poaching' as the tax base 'rightly' belongs to the other country.
Practices of this sort can appropriately be labeled harmful tax
competition as they do not reflect different judgments about the ap-
propriate level of taxes and the public outlays or the appropriate
mix of taxes in a particular economy, which are aspects of every
country's sovereignty in fiscal matters, but are, in effect, tailored to
attract investment or savings originating elsewhere or to facilitate
the avoidance of other countries' taxes. 127
From this passage one might infer that The Report will consider
the subjective motives behind a country's chosen tax system, an
action that violates the state's territorial sovereignty. 128 The
door is left open for those nations who have a long standing,
ideologically based policy to not tax their subjects to adopt such
122 Id. at para. 85.
123 Id. at para. 43. Race to the bottom refers to the practice of nations continu-
ously lowering their taxes in order to remain competitive, thus resulting in a race
to the lowest tax rate - the bottom. The Report refers to nations who do so as
"places that offer themselves as places to be used by non-residents to escape tax in
their own country . .. ." Id. at para. 41-44.
124 Id. at para. 89.
125 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at para. 91.
126 Paragraph 90 is illustrative of this, where the report concludes that "there
is a strong case for intensifying international co-operation when formulating a re-
sponse to the problem of harmful tax competition, although the counteracting mea-
sures themselves will continue to be primarily taken at the national ... level." Id. at
90 (emphasis added).
127 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at para. 29 (emphasis added).
128 See supra, Part I.A.
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a policy, while the door is closed on nations who may choose to
do the same in order to attract investors.129 The distinction, be-
tween those nations who wish to reduce their taxes but are una-
ble to do so, and those who are high tax states as a matter of
principle, would prove difficult to draw, as no state would ever
adopt a tax system which fails to support its budgetary
needs. 130
The Report calls for "severe" counter-measures to be insti-
tuted against those who do not accept and adopt its recommen-
dations. 131 The Report again dodges the burden of clearly
specifying what it is calling for and does not describe what se-
vere measures are; one may infer that they would involve some
form of international pressure or coercion. Such a conclusion is
supported by paragraph 171, which states that it would be
worthwhile for the OECD to further "explor[e] the possibility of
addressing harmful tax competition using a wide range of non-
tax measures." 132 This statement, more than any other, clearly
suggests that political or economic force, namely international
coercion, may be used by the OECD if tax havens are slow to
voluntarily adopt their recommendations. 133
This type of international coercion is perfectly logical in
light of the inequality of power that exists between the OECD
members, the most powerful nations in the world, and the tax
havens, which are economically weaker and geographically
smaller jurisdictions. 134 Directly forcing compliance would run
contrary to the OECD member's professed democratic ideals. By
allowing for voluntary conformance to their self-made stan-
dards, 135 the OECD leaves space for debate on the status of
129 See generally GAFFNEY, supra note 60, at 13-14.
130 See id. (supporting that many countries that may want to reduce their
taxes are unable to do so).
131 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at para. 95. The Report reads: "[s]evere counter-
measures are appropriate and indeed necessary to deal effectively with this ex-
treme type of harmful tax competition." Id.
132 Id. at para. 171.
133 See SPENCER, supra note 7, at 35 ("the Committee implicitly suggests that
political or economic pressures, or both, be exerted against those tax havens . ..
that ... do not voluntarily adopt the Committee's recommendations."); GAFFNEY,
supra note 60, at 7 ("the OECD countries are seeking to counteract these effects by
essentially coercive action. In practice, this means applying political pressure and
seeking to intervene in the internal affairs of other jurisdictions ... .
134 See id. at 7.
135 See supra Part II.B.(1).
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public international law. 136 It is a perversely clever maneuver.
By elevating their subjective internationally accepted standard
test to the level of customary international law vis-A-vis state
acquiescence, the OECD creates a situation where any state in
violation of the newly created standard may, with time, be con-
sidered in breach of international law, and more importantly, as
a consequence, be ultimately subject to increased coercion by
high tax states. 137
D. Noteworthy Abstentions
Switzerland and Luxembourg, both OECD members,'13 ab-
stained on relatively similar grounds from being bound by The
Report. Luxembourg's abstention is grounded in the belief that
bank secrecy, one of The Report's "key factors,"'139 is not a
source of harmful tax competition. Luxembourg further ob-
jected to the use of lack of exchange of information as a factor in
identifying a tax haven.140 These two objections stem from the
concern that The Report "lends credence to the so-called crite-
rion of reputation - a criterion without any objective basis."141
This further supports this article's primary concern: the tenu-
ous subjectivity of The Report. Luxembourg is also troubled by
the fact that any country when compared to another could have
the appearance of a tax haven.
Switzerland's objection consists of the following concerns:
(1) The Report's failure to take into account non-tax factors
which lead to harmful tax competition; (2) the intrusion on the
territorial sovereignty 142 of a state (by considering the fact that
tax rates of one state may be lower than another as a criterion);
(3) The Report's failure to take into account the structural dif-
ferences between states; and (4) the lack of incentive for off-
shore centers to assist foreign states in tracking down tax
136 See GAFFNEY, supra note 60, at 8.
137 See id.
138 See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
139 See supra Part II.B.(2).
140 Luxembourg states "[iut cannot accept that an exchange of information that
is circumscribed by the respect of international laws and respective national laws
be considered a criterion to identify a harmful preferential tax regime or tax ha-
ven." THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 74.
141 Id. at 74.
142 See supra Part I.B.(2).
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evaders. 143 Switzerland concedes that some forms of tax compe-
tition may be harmful; however, Switzerland stresses that it
also is not immune from these consequences.144 Thus, although
Switzerland agrees with a coordinated approach, its statements
implicitly suggests a laissez-faire approach, in which nations
are left to unilaterally determine the most effective means to
curb harmful tax practices. 45
The resolution of these issues will entail a lengthy process
that is just beginning to evolve. The lack of consensus within
the OECD itself provides non-members, at least for the time be-
ing, with assurances that this area will continue to be greatly
debated. Nonetheless, these recommendations, as Switzerland
and Luxembourg recognize, could have a profound impact on
those low tax jurisdictions whose survival is based on attracting
legitimate business. 46
III. CONCLUSION
The OECD's Report, quite ironically, has labeled as harm-
ful tax competition something that was created, encouraged,
and accepted when occurring within the national borders of the
high tax states themselves. 147 In reviewing the relevant his-
143 See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 76-78.
144 See id. at 76.
145 See id. at 76-77.
146 A case in point is the Cayman Islands, a dependent territory of the UK, who
in order to save its industry may be forced to vote for independence from the Brit-
ish crown. The Cayman Islands, who as a dependent of the UK must comply with
the recommendations of the Report vis-A-vis the UK's acceptance, is at risk of hav-
ing its investors flee to the Bahamas which is no longer under the British crown.
See GRUNDY, supra note 18, at 61-64; See also OFFSHORE OUTLOOK, supra note 4, at
6-7. The Cayman Islands, one of the first Caribbean countries to accept the money
laundering laws, have gone a long way to discourage criminals from doing business
in their jurisdiction. See generally Allen, supra note 26.
147 Best illustrative of this is the state of Florida in the US that has always
been considered a "tax haven" state because of its favorable taxation systems with
respect to retirees. For example, in 1982 the Federal tax was 50 percent, but if
retirees were to move to Florida then their tax liability would be no more than the
local tax rate. See GRUNDY, supra note 18, at 11. Surely, neighboring states felt
that this was eroding their tax base by attracting its citizens to seek shelter in
Florida. Yet, if a state were to make this argument in the US it would not receive
any support. For another illustration, consider the state of Delaware whose laws
of incorporation have traditionally been considered among the most flexible. Dela-
ware's favorable laws made incorporation of a company cheap and quick. Dela-
ware was never accused of engaging in harmful tax competition, although for
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tory, it is perhaps unsurprising that this is not the first time
that the U.S. Internal Revenue Services' criteria have been
used internationally to identify tax havens. 148 It should also be
of no surprise that The Report is saturated with the type of
highly subjective words of legal art to which American juris-
prudists have grown accustomed. 149 It is completely contradic-
tory for states such as the U.S., who preach competition in their
own private sectors, to now denounce that same type of competi-
tion merely because it is occurring between governments in the
international public forum.1 50
The Report seeks to end harmful tax competition by calling
for a global tax rate, but due to its overbroad language and fail-
ure to define any concrete standards, it also sweeps into its net
other forms of tax competition that may be beneficial.15 ' By
never adequately defining harmful tax competition and ignor-
ing the inherent benefits of differing competing tax rates, The
Report fully discounts any legitimate business reasons that en-
decades most entities in neighboring states would go and incorporate a company in
Delaware, not their own home states. Nonetheless, Panama, whose Companies
Law were modeled on the state of Delaware's, is considered to be engaging in
harmful tax competition. See id. at 39-40. (Both examples are hard to reconcile
unless what the US is saying is that what is good for the goose is not good for the
gander.)
148 When the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement was finalized, it was once
again the US and its governmental organs who devised the tax policies. Mexico
and Canada were essentially forced, due to their lack of power, to accept what the
US recommended. See Cockfield, supra note 100, at 44. This is a clear illustration
of the odious tenet by stronger nations that they may impose their will upon the
weaker. See also supra Part I.C.
149 For example: substantial. In the Report, one of the determining factors, no
"substantial activities" within the jurisdiction is a mirror image of a component of
the US test for determining personal jurisdiction over a person-namely a "substan-
tial connection." Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 106
(1987).
150 See Mason Gaffney, Taxation of Mobile Capital in a Global Free Market:
Opportunities and Threats for Low Tax Countries, and the Worldwide Benefits of
International Tax Competition (Sept. 2, 1998).
151 See Cockfield, supra note 100, at 48, stating that "[tihe economic benefits
derived from tax differentials can sometimes outweigh the benefits of efficiency
gains provided by tax integration.... ." Id. Furthermore, "[c]ompetition for capital
investment can be viewed as desirable insofar as it creates an incentive for govern-
ments to fashion an 'optimal regulatory burden."' Id. quoting from Charles E.
Mclure, Tax Competition: Is What's Good for the Private Goose also Good for the
Public Gander?, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 341-48 (1986).
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tities may have for moving their resources to low tax states. 152
Tax havens perceive themselves and offer themselves not as ju-
risdictions for evading taxes, but rather as business centers
that simply offer a superior services-to-costs ratio, something
that every profit maximizing entity seeks. 15
3
Due to the barrage of regulations and due diligence stan-
dards that have been imposed upon the offshore industry, it has
become significantly easier to open an international bank ac-
count in Miami, Florida than in the same bank's branch located
in Panama.15 4 The impact of this report on states, which due to
their lack of natural resources must rely on their financial in-
dustry, could produce even deeper concerns. Tax haven juris-
dictions associated with major powers, such as the Cayman
Islands who are still under the British Crown, may soon be
forced to choose between the lesser of the two evils: remain as-
sociated and be forced to comply with The Report's recommen-
dations or declare independence and give up the benefits that
such associations can bring.' 55
152 The legitimate reasons for doing business via an offshore are numerous.
Take for example a few reasons for establishing a trust offshore as opposed to on-
shore: (1) asset planning so that a wealthy individual may have more involvement
in deciding how to dispose of his assets; (2) tax mitigation (carrying out the trust in
the least expensive way); (3) asset protection from potential creditors; and (4)
clearer rules or no rules of perpetuity, forced heirship and other areas which com-
plicate matters in their own jurisdictions. A situation where an offshore trust
would be most effective is as follows. Assume a UK national, working in Hong
Kong, marries a local Chinese national where they establish their permanent
home. The UK national over time accumulates certain assets and together with
his wife they own all the shares of stock of several companies, some of which are
incorporated in foreign jurisdictions (i.e. Panama, Cayman Islands, Mexico, etc.)
and they also act as directors. Were any one of the directors (either Husband or
Wife) to die, the estates in a normal situation would be slow to settle and thus
would cause major disruption to the companies. By using a discretionary trust
offshore, the trust can own the shares in the companies and thus, when any one of
the directors dies, the company can continue under the direction of a surviving
family member and only the interests of the discretionary beneficiaries cease. See
Peter Willoughby, Offshore Trusts and Companies - Not Just For Int'l Tax Practi-
tioners, 24 STEP 15 at 20 (August 1998).
153 See Gaffney, supra note 150.
154 See OFFSHORE OUTLOOK, supra note 4, at 2; see also Willoughby, supra note
152 (suggesting that high tax states, before pointing the finger, should look at
their own national regulations which may create a tax haven like environment).
155 See Offshore Outlook, supra note 4, at 5-7.
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In the Cayman's, this question has caused many to funda-
mentally question the path of the small nation's future. 15 6 By
remaining under British rule the Cayman Islands would be sac-
rificing much of their territorial sovereignty, something the
Caymanians are in opposition to.15 7 However, by declaring in-
dependence the Caymanians would loose the benefit of being
watched for under the British Crown.158 Forcing the issue is the
latest British Crown report focusing on the existing financial
regulations within the Channel Islands. 159 Apparently in re-
sponse to the OECD's latest proposals, The Crown made its in-
tent to crack down on these low tax jurisdictions perfectly
clear. 160 Like many in their position, the ultimate question that
the Caymanians face is to what degree is it folly to further sac-
rifice their sovereignty in order to satisfy a few powerful nations
who arguably should first look within their own borders before
beginning to point the finger.
The Report does not cure the uncertainty that has long




159 See Andrew Edwards, Review of Financial regulations in The Crown Depen-
dencies (visited Nov. 20 1998) <http://www.nds.coi.gov.uk/coi/coip [hereinafter The
Edwards Report]. The Edwards Report seeks to increase the level of transparency
in all financial dealings and recommends the establishing of Financial Crime
Units on each of the Channel Islands. See id. These crime units are intended to
carry out on-site inspections. See id. The Edwards Report also recommends ap-
pointing financial services ombudsmen to assist in the regulating of the financial
services industry. See id. The Edwards Report also stresses cooperation and
states that "the Islands are firmly committed to combat crimes of all kinds ... and
to the fullest co-operation with other jurisdictions." Id. Another area that The Ed-
wards Report pays particular attention to are the regulations with respect to nomi-
nee directors. See generally The Edwards Report. It states that the Islands should
consider requiring "disclosure of true (beneficial) ownership where this differs
from nominal ownership" and in addition, the islands should also consider "includ-
ing a requirement to report changes in beneficial ownership." Id. Aside from these
specific objectives, The Edwards Report goes on to include ambiguous provisions
such as "mak[ing] it as difficult as possible for practitioners to engage in, facilitate
or acquiesce in disreputable conduct of any kind. . . ." Id. (emphais added). An-
other perfect example is where The Edwards Report recommends that the Islands
enact measures to "restrain assets in cases of unexplained life-styles ---. " Id.
(emphasis added). What should this a huge concern for the Cayman Islands is that
the British Crown appears to be very serious as they expect to have these mea-
sures implemented by the Spring of the year 2000, at which point the Cayman
Islands might well be next on the Crown's agenda. See id.
160 See The Edwards Report, supra note 159.
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that people by their nature are concerned with maximizing
profits and reducing costs, and as such, the competition for capi-
tal will never cease. These latest efforts are unlikely to gain
support from low tax jurisdictions. Such jurisdictions are very
aware of the potential result of The Report's initiative: not an
end to the situation, but simply a relocation, as well as a re-
casting of the players - with them left in the street. Thus, the
only remaining question, which The Report subtly answers, is
who will decide where and how this competition will take place
in the future.
George M. Melo
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